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Examining the International Judicial 
Function:  International Courts as Dispute 
Resolvers 
ANNA SPAIN* 
INTRODUCTION 
International courts are a fundamental component of the 
international legal system.1 They exist to provide an impartial forum 
capable of settling disputes between nations by administering binding 
decisions based on international law. But when should international 
courts aim to serve a different goal? How might their international 
judicial function bring about an end to a legal dispute in order to further 
aims of critical importance to the international community as a whole? 
Are international courts responsible for promoting global peace and 
security and is it ever appropriate for courts and judges to engage in 
judicial peacemaking?  
Questioning the function of international courts, and the judges 
they engage, is an intrepid task, in part, because of certain assumptions 
about what dispute settlement is and what it is not. Asking courts to 
engage in activities that extend beyond adjudication seems contrary to 
the authority vested in them by the international community of States 
 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado Law School. This article was originally 
presented at the Project on International Courts and Tribunals (PICT) symposium on The 
International Judicial Function at the University of Amsterdam in March 2011. I am grateful to 
Jean d’Aspremont, David Caron, Cesare Romano, Yuval Shany, Phillipe Sands, Judge Tullio 
Treves of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the participants of the PICT 
symposium, and the participants of the University of Colorado Law School workshop for their 
helpful comments. I also wish to give special thanks to Professor Samantha Besson for her 
detailed written response to an earlier draft, which has provided insights I have incorporated here. 
 1. This article uses the term “international courts” to describe judicial and arbitral 
institutions that engage in international adjudication. See Philippe Sands, Introduction to RUTH 
MACKENZIE ET AL., THE MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS ix–xvi (2d ed. 
2010) (defining international courts and tribunals and describing the array of institutions that 
comprise the international judicial system). 
  
6 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 34:5 
and may threaten their legitimacy.2 However, the very historical 
formation of many judicial institutions provides an alternative narrative. 
That narrative imagines that courts are institutions that have been 
created after times of international conflict in order to address the 
causes that led to war and to prevent States from resorting to the use of 
force as a means for resolving their differences.3 This history calls into 
question whether international courts should concern themselves with 
the promotion of global peace and security. 
Within this context, this article undertakes an examination of the 
international judicial function of international courts, exploring both 
what it is and what it ought to be. There are two commonly held ways 
of understanding the purpose of the international judicial function in 
this context. A conservative view understands the judicial function of 
international courts as one of dispute settlement. As institutions formed 
by international agreement to provide adjudication through judicial 
settlement or arbitration, international courts have the authority and the 
capacity to produce binding judgments that settle disputes.4 Under this 
perspective, dispute settlement is a functional, pragmatic activity. 
Courts perform their duties without exceeding their judicial authority 
with the aim of serving their State clients. This function is valuable and 
necessary and has grown in recent decades with the establishment of 
new judicial forums.5 
 
 2. See, e.g., R.P. ANAND, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 183–90 (1969) 
(discussing the challenges and limitations of the judicial process and the ICJ). Anand also notes 
that  
if the judges are asked to solve questions for which accepted judicial techniques afford 
no satisfactory answer, the matter indeed becomes difficult and disturbing . . . . In a 
rapidly changing and varied world . . . in order that international law may be adapted to 
changing conditions, alongside the judicial bodies, it is essential to develop other 
procedures of adjustment. 
Id. at 186. 
 3. See, e.g., Nancy Amoury Combs, Diplomatic Adjudication, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 267, 273  
(2001) (describing the function of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal as serving both a functional 
purpose of effectively managing the adjudication of claims and a diplomatic aim of managing the 
relationship between the United States and Iran). 
 4. Joseph Sinde Warioba, Monitoring Compliance with and Enforcement of Binding 
Decisions of International Courts, 5 MAX PLANCK Y.B. UNITED NATIONS L. 41 (2001). 
 5. See Sands, supra note 1, ix–xvi (describing the trend towards compulsory jurisdiction); 
Cesare P.R. Romano, The Shift from the Consensual to the Compulsory Paradigm in 
International Adjudication:  Elements for a Theory of Consent, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 791, 
792–95 (2007) (discussing the shift toward compelling disputants to consent to the jurisdiction of 
an international adjudicative body); Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Not Quite a World Without Trials:  
Why International Dispute Resolution Is Increasingly Judicialized, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 119, 119  
(2006) (discussing the increase in the use of trials to resolve international legal disputes); and see 
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A more audacious and normative understanding of the 
international judicial function holds that international courts are 
peacemakers. That is, their institutional function is to provide dispute 
settlement in a manner that promotes global peace and security.6 This 
view finds support in the historical development of the international 
judicial system. Many of the judicial institutions and practices of today 
were born in the aftermath of armed conflicts as States sought ways to 
prevent future wars. The creation of the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) after World War II under the UN Charter offers an archetype.7 
Even absent a clear and authoritative mandate, other courts have been 
known to engage in dispute resolution for peacemaking purposes. The 
Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), for example, has recognized its 
part in providing a peacemaking function when adjudicating disputes 
that are a part of ongoing armed conflicts.8 However, there are 
challenges to this function and this article examines two:  the doctrine 
of justiciability, which seeks to limit the expansion of judicial powers 
by restricting the type of disputes international courts may address;9 and 
the doctrine of litispendence, which seeks to define how international 
courts should coordinate with other institutions engaged in 
peacemaking.10 
These two perspectives of the judicial function of international 
courts—as dispute settlers or as peacemakers—are at times in tension 
with one another. Though all courts aim to settle disputes, not all courts 
 
generally Thomas Buergenthal, Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals:  Is It Good 
or Bad?, 14 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 267 (2001); Stephen Schwebel, The Proliferation of International 
Tribunals:  Threat or Promise, in JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW—FURTHER SELECTED 
WRITINGS OF STEPHEN M. SCHWEBEL 101, 107 (2011) (describing the proliferation of judicial 
opinions and proposing that “[a] possible if limited approach might be to extend the Court’s 
advisory jurisdiction” to avoid conflicting interpretations of international law). 
 6. See HANS KELSEN, PEACE THROUGH LAW, 13–14 (2000) (“As long as it is not possible 
to remove from the interested States the prerogative to answer the question of law and transfer it 
once and for all to an impartial authority, namely, an international court, any further progress on 
the way to the pacification of the world is absolutely excluded.”). 
 7. See U.N. Charter Ch. VI, art. 36.3 (“[L]egal disputes should as a general rule be referred 
by the parties to the International Court of Justice.”). 
 8. See generally, e.g., Delimiting Abyei Area (Sudan v. The Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement/Army), Final Award (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2009), www.pca-cpa.org/showfile.asp?fil_id= 
1240 [hereinafter Delimiting Abyei Area, Final Award] (providing terms for a delimitation of the 
Abyei area). 
 9. Hersch Lauterpacht, The Doctrine of Non-Justiciable Disputes in International Law, 24 
ECONOMICA 277, 277 (1928). 
 10. THEODOOR J.H. ELSEN, LITISPENDENCE BETWEEN THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF 
JUSTICE AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL 1 (1986). 
  
8 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 34:5 
aim to be peacemakers. The first view of their function is concerned 
with a court’s effectiveness while the latter is concerned with its 
normative practice. Courts are bound to stay within their authority when 
engaging in judicial settlement, yet resolving disputes may require 
exercising extrajudicial powers to engage non-State stakeholders and 
extralegal issues in the dispute resolution process. Furthermore, judicial 
settlement is not designed to reconcile the relationship between the 
parties or prevent recurrence of the dispute.11 When tensions escalate, it 
is not clear that dispute settlement is an effective deterrent to war.  
Yet, such challenges do not absolve international courts from their 
responsibility to contribute to promoting global peace and security. As a 
central part of the international legal machinery, courts have a role that 
is not simply functional but is also normative. Judges and judicial 
institutions do not exist in a sphere that can or should be isolated from 
geopolitics and issues of concern to the international community. 
International courts need to consider how they can better contribute to 
an international legal system that can ensure the successful resolution of 
disputes.  
This article argues that what is needed is a third way of 
understanding the international judicial function, one that respects 
international courts’ traditional role as dispute settlers while allowing 
for their more engaged and proactive function as peacemakers. This 
requires adopting a new perspective, which abandons a dichotomous 
view of the international judicial function. Under this new perspective, 
international courts exist within the system of international dispute 
resolution (IDR) containing a myriad of institutions and methods that 
collectively aim to promote global peace and security.12 Furthermore, 
the resolution of international disputes may require integrated IDR 
approaches, such as combining judicial settlement with negotiation.13 
 
 11. See Richard B. Bilder, Some Limitations of Adjudication as an International Dispute 
Settlement Technique, 23 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 4 (1982) (explaining the potential inability of a legal 
judgment to address the underlying issues which prompted the legal dispute). 
 12. For purposes of this article, the IDR system includes institutions and other providers of 
methods used to prevent, manage, and resolve international disputes by means of negotiation as 
well as third-party methods, which include adjudication (judicial settlement and arbitration) and 
other methods (conciliation, facilitation, and mediation). See Anna Spain, Integration Matters:  
Rethinking the Architecture of International Dispute Resolution, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1, 8–9 
(2010) (defining the architecture of the IDR system). 
 13.  See, e.g., Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South 
Ledge (Malay./Sing.), Judgment, 2008 I.C.J. 12, ¶ 102 (May 23) (where the disputant States 
engaged in negotiations prior to referring the case to the ICJ). See generally Spain, supra note 12 
(introducing the concept of integrated IDR through “multiple” and “mixed” IDR methods).  
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Integration can occur sequentially through the use of multiple methods 
(for example, negotiations may precede adjudication or mediation may 
follow) or in a mixed-manner that allows different aspects of IDR 
methods to be combined into one cohesive process.14 
Understanding IDR as a system of methods that can be integrated 
in their use creates new opportunities for international courts in their 
role as dispute resolvers. At a minimum, international courts can 
enhance international dispute resolution capacity by recognizing the 
benefits of non-judicial methods.15 Recognition is becoming more 
necessary as these methods proliferate in use and form.16 It will allow 
international courts to be more responsive in recognizing their role in 
relation to other actors in the IDR system.17 Second, some courts can 
appropriately play a more active role by referring the parties to other 
forms of IDR before or after a court undertakes judicial settlement. 
Third, there is an institutional void that certain international judicial 
bodies might fill. International courts might serve as institutional 
coordinators, much like the “Multi-Door Courthouse” concept 
pioneered by Frank Sander in 1979 that has become commonplace in 
the United States.18 Though this model is not an exact fit because 
international courts face challenges that domestic courts do not,19 it 
does, nonetheless, embody the concept that courts can provide the 
leadership necessary to coordinate the application of various IDR 
methods in order to enhance the effectiveness of international dispute 
resolution.  
In summary, this article argues that in addition to engaging in 
effective judicial discourse, issuing judgments, and providing judicial 
settlement, international courts should exercise their influence in ways 
 
 14. Spain, supra note 12, at 31. 
 15. Id. at 33. 
 16. Id. at 3. 
 17. See id. at 45–46. 
 18. See generally Frank E.A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, in THE POUND 
CONFERENCE:  PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler 
eds., 1979) (Harvard Law Professor Frank Sander introduced the concept of the Multi-Door 
Courthouse at the 1976 Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the 
Administration of Justice, also known as the “Pound Conference,” proposing that courts in the 
U.S. should offer more than one “door” or method of dispute resolution. As a result, many courts 
now refer disputing parties to mediation, facilitation, and other forms of nonjudicial dispute 
resolution). 
 19. See generally Karin Oellers-Fraham, Multiplication of International Courts and 
Tribunals and Conflicting Jurisdiction—Problems and Possible Solutions, in MAX PLANCK Y.B. 
UNITED NATIONS L. 67 (2001) (discussing the unique problems international courts face, which 
are not associated with domestic courts). 
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that enhance IDR.20 This is a normative claim that asserts that 
international courts do have a responsibility to promote global peace 
and security. To achieve this, international courts must understand their 
role as adjudicators within the larger IDR system. There is not sufficient 
space here to identify the actions that specific international courts might 
take in this regard. This article does suggest, however, that courts 
should recognize the value of other IDR methods and, when 
appropriate, refer disputing parties to engage in them. International 
courts should also determine how they might better coordinate with 
other dispute resolution providers and how they might support methods, 
such as mediation, that lack adequate institutional support at the 
international level.21 
Centered in this context, the following definitional understandings 
apply. First, the term “international courts” refers to those institutions 
created by international agreement for the purpose of adjudicating 
disputes. These institutions include global courts (the ICJ, etc.), 
arbitration institutions (the PCA, etc.), international criminal 
adjudicative bodies (the International Criminal Court (ICC), etc.), and 
human rights courts.22 Though each court operates within its own 
mandate and authority, it does not operate in an isolated space. The 
actions of one court can affect other courts and exert a sphere of 
influence on the international judicial system as a whole. Each 
institution is unique in its form and function, and this article does not 
seek to evaluate them separately or in depth. Instead, this article 
presumes that these institutions share the common goal of providing the 
international judicial function through dispute settlement and in certain 
instances, through peacemaking. Second, the terms “settlement,” 
“peacemaking,” and “resolution” are used here to give a nuanced 
understanding to the posited goal that each method seeks to achieve. 
Resolution implies that the underlying circumstances giving rise to the 
dispute have been satisfactorily addressed so that they no longer exist, 
whereas settlement implies that the parties have reached a binding 
agreement, whether or not underlying issues remain. In addition, an 
 
 20. See, e.g., HIGHEST COURTS AND GLOBALISATION (Sam Muller & Sidney Richards eds., 
2011) (for essays discussing transjudicial dialogue, judicial cooperation, legal unity, and other 
theories of multiplicity in the international judicial system). 
 21. Spain, supra note 12, at 19. See also Anne Peters, International Dispute Settlement:  A 
Network of Cooperational Duties, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1, 3, 5, 9 (2003). 
 22. Sands, supra note 1, at v–vi (classifying international adjudicative bodies into these 
categories). 
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international court may use its adjudicative powers to provide a 
peacemaking function to assist the parties in bringing about an end to 
armed conflict. Third, international legal disputes often arise out of or 
occur concurrently with international conflicts involving armed or 
violent contact. This includes intrastate conflicts that, through spillover 
effects or other circumstances, pose a threat to global peace and 
security.23  
This article proceeds as follows. Part I considers the dispute 
settlement function of international courts. Part II examines 
international courts as peacemakers and analyzes how the doctrines of 
justiciability and litispendence influence this function. Part III 
introduces a framework for understanding the judicial function of 
international courts as one of dispute resolution. It argues that 
international courts can enhance their judicial function by appreciating 
how different IDR processes contribute to effective dispute resolution. 
The article concludes by proposing how international courts might 
contribute to international dispute resolution and promote peace and 
security as a component of the broader IDR system.  
I.  COURTS AS DISPUTE SETTLERS 
International courts settle disputes through judicial settlement or 
arbitration.24 Adjudication by either method produces a binding decision 
based on international law.25 The benefits of this process are many. 
Above all, adjudication provides parties with a certainty of process and 
an outcome that enjoys the authority and legitimacy of international 
law.26  
Although modern dispute settlement, which emerged in the late 
19th century with the Alabama claims as the seminal case, was largely 
ad hoc, today it enjoys a number of established forums.27 In addition to 
 
 23. See MEREDITH REID SARKEES & FRANK WHELON WAYMAN, RESORT TO WAR 1816–
2007, 46–60 (2010) (defining armed conflict by context including interstate, intrastate (civil and 
internal), extrastate, and non-State. The international component of a given conflict has generally 
been understood as occurring between States, but also applies to intrastate and non-State events 
that present a threat to international peace and security due to spillover effects, the presence of 
international crimes, and other factors.) 
 24. J.G. MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 91 (4th ed. 2005) (providing 
definitions that distinguish one form from the other). 
 25. Id. 
 26. See Bilder, supra note 11, at 2–3.  
 27. 1 HISTORY AND DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS TO WHICH THE 
UNITED STATES HAS BEEN A PARTY 495 (John Basset Moore ed., 1898) (detailing the Alabama 
claims); JOHN COLLIER & VAUGHAN LOWE, THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES IN INTERNATIONAL 
 
  
12 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 34:5 
the ICJ, parties may seek dispute settlement through the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) or the Dispute Settlement 
System of the World Trade Organization (WTO), and may seek 
arbitration through the PCA or International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID).28 The ICC, ad hoc tribunals, and hybrid 
tribunals are available for international criminal matters.29 There are 
also courts that specialize in human rights, including the European 
Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
and the African Commission on Human Rights. Together, these courts 
and tribunals form the basis of the international judicial system.30 
Given the diversity of judicial bodies, their differences, and 
specializations, this article does not try to analyze the specific or unique 
international judicial functions of each. The users of international 
courts, the judges, and the courts themselves all hold perspectives about 
what the judicial function is and should be. How a court performs its 
functions necessarily depends on the context:  the actors involved, the 
type of case, the judicial institution as well as the external 
circumstances surrounding the dispute.31 However, what is common 
among international courts is that they are all judicial organs that 
function according to the same parameters of the international legal 
system.32 Given this, it is helpful to analyze the international judicial 
function of dispute resolution from a contextual perspective, taking into 
account historical influences as well as the environment in which courts 
operate today.  
The question this article considers is not whether the international 
judicial function is one of dispute settlement—it is clear that it is—but 
whether this is all the international judicial function should be. There 
are several arguments in favor of limiting the international judicial 
 
LAW 32–33 (1999) (describing the origins of modern arbitration dating back to the Treaty of 
Amity, Commerce and Navigation (the “Jay Treaty”) and the transition from diplomacy to 
decisions based on legal reasoning that occurred in the arbitration of the Alabama claims).  
 28. Sands, supra note 1, at ix–x (defining global courts as institutions that are potentially 
available to all States and/or enjoy unlimited subject-matter jurisdiction).  
 29. Id. at v–vi, ix–xvii, 68. 
 30. See Sir Robert Y. Jennings, The Proliferation of Adjudicatory Bodies:  Dangers and 
Possible Answers, in 9 AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BULLETIN 2, 3 (Laurence 
Boisson de Chazournes et al. eds., 1995). See also Sands, supra note 1 at xi.  
 31. Georges Abi-Saab, The Normalization of International Adjudication:  Convergence and 
Divergencies, 43 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 9–10 (2010).  
 32. See id. (arguing that the concept of judicial function is not generic in nature but 
influenced by particulars such as the structure of the international legal system). 
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function to dispute settlement rather than the more expansive function 
of peacekeeping.  
First, the historical nexus between the evolution of courts and 
international conflict does not automatically justify establishing 
peacemaking as a function of international courts today. States’ 
motivations for pursuing adjudication should not be conflated with the 
goal of pursuing peace.33  
Second, judicial settlement is what courts are authorized to do.34 
Most adjudicative institutions are formed by a mandate that authorizes 
their role in pacific settlement of disputes and no more.35 Though some 
institutions, such as the WTO, ITLOS, and ICSID, offer conciliation 
and other methods in addition to judicial settlement, they are clear that 
their role is an apolitical and functional one, not a mandate to intervene 
in matters of peace and security.36 The view is that their role is to 
provide the requisite legal and technical expertise needed to perform the 
function of dispute settlement.37 By maintaining a narrow and 
specialized focus, international courts, such as the ICSID and the WTO, 
for example, enhance their expertise in a particular subject matter.38  
Furthermore, some courts lack the capacity to do more.39 While the 
ICJ is a court of general jurisdiction over all UN member States, other 
courts have more limited jurisdiction.40 In addition, all courts are limited 
 
 33. See Jennings, supra note 30, at 7 (criticizing the “pacific” title in the Hague Convention 
and arguing that the act of States resorting to adjudication as opposed to war is not to be conflated 
with the distinction between pacific and non-pacific); David D. Caron, War and International 
Adjudication:  Reflections on the 1899 Peace Conference, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 4, 17 (2000) (noting 
that the founders of the Permanent Court of International Justice argued that judges should not 
serve a diplomatic function). 
 34. Abi-Saab, supra note 31, at 2.  
 35. See id. at 10. 
 36. Id. at 2; Jennings, supra note 30, at 7. 
 37. See Abi-Saab, supra note 31, at 14. 
 38. Jennings, supra note 30, at 3–4.  
 39. J.G. Merrills, The Role and Limits of International Adjudication, INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 169, 169–81 (W. E. Butler ed., 1987) (exploring “why 
adjudication as a process is capable of dealing with some disputes and not with others”); G. 
Shinkaretskaya, The Present and Future Role of International Adjudication as a Means for 
Peacefully Settling Disputes, 29 INDIAN J. INT’L L. 87, 88–90 (1989) (suggesting that an 
international court cannot play a role in avoiding armed conflict because the court has “no powers 
to act independently and possess[es] very limited opportunities for influencing the political 
conduct of State Parties to a dispute”); Rosalyn Higgins, Remedies and the International Court of 
Justice:  An Introduction, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:  THE INSTITUTIONAL DILEMMA, 
1, 2–5 (Malcolm D. Evans ed. 1998) (describing how the ICJ lacks the capacity to hear all of the 
cases submitted to it in a timely manner). 
 40. Shinkaretskaya, supra note 39, at 88–90.  
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in their ability to involve non-State stakeholders in the judicial 
process.41 Courts are not designed to adjudicate extra-legal issues and, 
therefore, are at a disadvantage when treating political, economic, 
social, and cultural issues that arise in international disputes.42  
Third, extending the international judicial function beyond judicial 
settlement poses certain risks. It could compromise the legitimacy of a 
court or of the judges themselves.43 If judges consider post hoc effects 
of their judgment, they may be unduly influenced to decide the matter 
differently. Furthermore, allowing international courts to decide matters 
of vital State interest takes away a State’s role as the “ultimate judge of 
disputed legal rights in its controversies with other States.”44  
Though all of these reasons are worthy arguments in favor of 
restricting the international judicial function to dispute settlement, they 
fail to overcome a fundamental need to have international institutions, 
including courts, help humanity pursue the goal, however aspirational, 
of global peace.45 In reality many international legal disputes, 
particularly those that arise in the context of an armed conflict, are also 
political. It is true that judges should not be unduly influenced by 
politics, but it would be unreasonable and impractical to ask them to 
remain insulated from global affairs. If a judge knows that the outcome 
of a case will influence whether or not violence continues, should that 
not be a factor worthy of consideration? As Judge Corstends, President 
of the Dutch Supreme Court, recommends “[p]erhaps one of the most 
important lessons to learn for today’s highest courts is that they are not 
isolated, that their problems are unlikely to be peculiar to their own 
jurisdictions[.]”46 The answer is not to turn a blind eye to these 
influences but to determine how they might enhance, not impede, the 
international judicial function of dispute resolution.  
 
 41. See Rosalyn Higgins, The ICJ, the ECJ and the Integrity of International Law, 52 INT’L 
& COMP. L.Q. 1, 12 (2003) (describing both the increasing importance of non-State entities in 
today’s global arena and the lack of legal jurisdiction over these entities). 
 42. HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
4, 6–7 (1933). 
 43. Abi-Saab, supra note 31, at 10. 
 44. See LAUTERPACHT, supra note 42, at 6–7. 
 45. Merrills, supra note 39, at 175.  
 46. Judge Geert Corstens, Foreward to HIGHEST COURTS AND GLOBALISATION, supra note 
20, at vi. 
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II.  COURTS AS PEACEMAKERS 
An alternative way of understanding the international judicial 
function is to conceptualize international courts as peacemakers. There 
is a historical nexus between the development of the international 
judicial function of dispute resolution and the international 
community’s efforts to ensure peace. Early forms of arbitration used a 
third State to broker peace between two disputing States through ad hoc 
processes that much resemble the forms we refer to today as good 
offices and facilitation.47 Later attempts to formalize dispute resolution, 
such as the creation of the PCA, coincided with a burgeoning peace 
movement and contributed to the institutional development of courts as 
peacemakers.48 The First Hague Peace Conference of 1899 was 
convened by Czar Nicholas II of Russia “with the object of seeking the 
most effective means of ensuring all peoples the benefits of a real and 
lasting peace and, above all, of limiting the progressive development of 
existing armaments.”49  
After World War II, the international community considered the 
question of responsibility for world peace and set up a framework for 
preserving peace through the UN Charter.50 Article 92 established the 
ICJ as “the principal judicial organ of the United Nations”51 responsible 
for deciding legal disputes of an international nature.52 The Charter also 
put additional IDR machinery into place with Article 2 calling upon all 
nations to refrain from the threat or use of force.53 Article 33 requires 
that “[t]he parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to 
endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first 
of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, 
arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or 
 
 47. Caron, supra note 33, at 4. See generally Abi-Saab, supra note 31 (discussing ad hoc 
processes). 
 48. Caron, supra note 33, at 4. 
 49. Russian Circular Note Proposing the Program of the First Conference, THE HAGUE 
CONVENTIONS AND DECLARATIONS OF 1899 AND 1907 xvi (James Brown Scott ed., 1915). 
 50. U.N. Charter, supra note 7, pmbl. (“We the Peoples of the United Nations Determined to 
save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought 
untold sorrow to mankind . . .”). 
 51. Id. art. 92.  
 52. ICJ STATUTE arts. 2 and 36, respectively; Statute of the International Court of Justice, 59 
Stat. 1031 (1945). 
 53. See U.N. Charter, supra note 7, art. 2 ¶ 4 (calling for nations to refrain from the threat or 
use of force).  
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arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.”54 Article 24 
establishes the mandate for the UN Security Council (UNSC) as bearing 
the “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace 
and security” and the UN General Assembly’s (UNGA) role, 
respectively.55 
The seminal example of an international court as peacemaker is the 
ICJ. The ICJ Statute sets up the Court as the “principal judicial organ of 
the United Nations”56 to serve as the primary court of general 
jurisdiction for adjudicating disputes arising under international law.57 
As an organ of the UN, the purpose of the ICJ is to assist in the 
contribution of global peace and security by providing States with a 
peaceful mechanism for resolving their differences. This historical 
context establishes the international judicial function as a central 
component of a system designed to ensure global peace.58 But providing 
this role is not without its challenges. This article examines two:  
justiciability and litispendence. 
A.  Justiciability  
The question of justiciability presents a challenge for international 
courts on several grounds. States have long sought clear criteria to 
delineate the scope of judicial review for international courts.59 The 
former U.S. Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, for example, criticized 
the ICJ for its lack of clear criteria on the question of justiciability.60 He 
argued that after the Cuban Missile Crisis there were certain political-
 
 54. Id. art. 33, ¶ 1 (urging member nations to seek peaceful resolutions to international 
disputes). 
 55. Id. arts. 10–22, 24. 
 56. ICJ STATUTE, art. 1. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 1, Oct. 24, 1945, 
59 Stat. 1031. 
 57. See Christine Chinkin, Increasing the Use and Appeal of the Court, in INCREASING THE 
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE:  PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
ICJ/UNITAR COLLOQUIUM TO CELEBRATE THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE COURT 56 (Connie 
Peck & Roy S. Lee eds., 1997). 
 58. U.N. Charter pmbl. 
 59. See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 
1986 I.C.J. 14, 238 (June 27) (dissenting opinion of Judge Oda) (discussing how the trauvaux 
preparatoires of the ICJ Statute and applicable State practice suggest that, in accepting the ICJ 
Statutes, States did not intend to submit themselves to judicial settlement over political disputes). 
 60. Dean Acheson, Remarks by the Honorable Dean Acheson, 57 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 
PROC. 13, 13–14 (1968).  
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legal situations that were so central to a State’s vital interests that the 
ICJ should not interfere.61  
Indeed, States evaluate the competency of international courts in 
part based on the court’s ability to clarify what kinds of disputes are 
justiciable.62 The doctrine of justiciability that provides this clarification 
has traditionally been determined by making the distinction between 
disputes that are fundamentally legal in nature and those that are 
political.63 Justiciability has been defined according to several criteria:  
whether the judicial process can adequately address a dispute; whether 
the dispute is sufficiently legal in nature; whether the dispute is over 
rights or interests; and, whether, in deciding the dispute, a court would 
have to interfere with a political act or question (e.g., regarding national 
security, defense, foreign affairs, etc.).64 
Lauterpacht, an early critic of using such dichotomies between 
juridical and non-juridical issues as a basis for determining whether or 
not a dispute is justiciable, suggests two important frames for examining 
this problem.65 First, when States pursue judicial settlement through an 
international court, the dispute is political. This is because all 
international disputes are political if we define political as being of 
importance to the State involved in the dispute.66 Beyond interstate 
disputes, other kinds of international disputes may also be inherently 
political if they implicate international interests, such as global peace 
and security.67 Second, all international disputes may also be defined as 
legal if we understand that to mean that the dispute can be addressed 
through the application of international law.68 Furthermore, Lauterpacht 
questions States’ assertion of nonjusticiability and believes that such 
actions result from States’ preference to resolve matters through other 
means.69 And indeed, States prefer mediation and other forms of non-
 
 61. Id. See also EUGENE ROSTOW, Dispute Involving the Inherent Right of Self-Defense, in 
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS 264, 264 (Lori Fisler Damrosch ed., 
1987). 
 62. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 42, at 4, 6–7, 21, 42–45, 153–54, 158, 163–65. 
 63. Id. at 4. 
 64. Id. at 4, 19. 
 65. Id. at 158. 
 66. Id. at vii, 153 (understanding international disputes, at that time, as interstate disputes). 
 67. See id. at 11.  
 68. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 42, at 158. 
 69. Id. at 163–65. 
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judicial IDR to adjudication to resolve international disputes that arise 
from armed conflict.70  
Higgins proposes an alternative approach to analyzing justiciability 
based on two dominant and opposing frameworks. The British approach 
adopts a formalistic view that international courts are prohibited from 
addressing political disputes.71 The American approach adopts a view 
that judicial decision making necessarily involves making political and 
social judgments; the two cannot be separated.72 Higgins argues that the 
distinction provided by the terms “political dispute” and “legal dispute” 
is valuable not because it describes the nature of the dispute but because 
it describes the nature of the process by which the dispute is to be 
resolved.73  
A third approach to determine the justiciability of disputes is to 
clarify whether they are over rights or interests. Understood as the 
doctrine of ‘inherent limitations’ of the judicial function in international 
law, conflicts of rights are justiciable, whereas conflicts of interests are 
not.74 The ICJ Statute merely requires that disputes include “any 
question of international law” and thus, does not speak to the 
rights/interests distinction.75 In practice, the ICJ has decided many cases 
involving political interests including Nicaragua,76 Certain Expenses,77 
 
 70. See JACOB BERCOVITCH & JUDITH FRETTER, REGIONAL GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL 
CONFLICT AND MANAGEMENT FROM 1945 TO 2003, 29 (2004) (illustrating that in a study of 343 
international conflicts, 59.3% used mediation, 32.2% used negotiation, 3.6% were referred to 
international organizations, 3% used multilateral conferences, 1.3% had no management, and 
only 0.6% resorted to arbitration); Derrick V. Frazier & William J. Dixon, Third-Party 
Intermediaries and Negotiated Settlements, 1946-2000, 32 INT’L INTERACTIONS 395 (2006) 
(using a dataset documenting conflict management of militarized interstate disputes occurring 
from 1946 to 2000 and finding that mediation was the most preferred IDR method, and 
adjudication was among the least preferred). 
 71. Rosalyn Higgins, Policy Considerations and the International Judicial Process, in 
THEMES AND THEORIES 21–23, 34 (2009). 
 72. Id. at 22–23. See also R. P. Anand, Attitude of the Asian-African States Toward Certain 
Problems of International Law, 15 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 55, 56, 66, 73 (1966) (arguing that third 
world States may generally subscribe to a view of international law located somewhere between 
the British and American views and newly independent States are reluctant to accept ICJ 
jurisdiction in disputes with former colonial powers, fearing that the ICJ will enforce the 
“established legal rights” of former colonizers. These States are otherwise accepting of the 
international legal system, viewing it as sufficiently objective to protect them from more powerful 
States). 
 73. Higgins, supra note 71, at 34. 
 74. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 42, at 42–45. 
 75. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 36, Oct. 24, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031. 
 76. See generally Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 14 (sustaining Nicaragua’s claims that U.S. 
support of insurrectionary forces in Nicaragua was an unlawful use of armed force and an 
impermissible intervention in Nicaragua’s internal affairs).  
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and Nuclear Weapons.78 There are also cases, such as Anglo Iranian Oil 
Co., where the parties involved were reluctant to pursue judicial 
settlement because conflicts over interests were at issue and they 
believed that the ICJ’s judicial function should be to enforce existing 
legal rights.79 
As a practical matter, it is difficult to establish clear criteria by 
which to distinguish what is legal from what is political. In part, this is 
because the legal and political natures of a dispute are vitally 
interconnected. Though certain issues are political questions, which are 
not justiciable (e.g., intra-governmental conflicts, claims attacking the 
legitimacy of a State’s political authority, questions concerning the 
source of legal power),80 the political angles that arise in the context of 
international disputes are not so clearly defined. Many international 
disputes are multifaceted and naturally involve both legal and extra-
legal issues.81 Moreover, legal issues are difficult to identify and treat 
independently of the larger context of the conflict in which they might 
occur. 
The Nicaragua case illustrates several difficulties that have arisen 
around these questions. Nicaragua was the first case in which the ICJ 
was called upon to adjudicate the legality of a State’s use of force 
during an ongoing conflict. Nicaragua claimed that U.S. support of the 
Contras amounted to illegal intervention into its internal affairs, a 
breach of international law involving both a clear legal dispute as well 
as a political one.82 The United States argued that because the issues 
before the Court were part of an ongoing, armed conflict they were 
inherently political in nature and were therefore nonjusticiable.83 The 
 
 77. Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. 151, at 8 (July 
20). 
 78. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 14; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Order, 
1995 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 1). 
 79. See Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (U.K. v. Iran), Preliminary Objection, 1952 I.C.J. 5, at 8–10 
(July 22) (outlining Iran’s arguments for why the ICJ lacked jurisdiction).  
 80. EDWARD MCWHINNEY, JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES 40 
(1991) (describing the legal category of “political questions” as a tool of judicial self-restraint and 
deference to executive or legislative power). 
 81. See Hermann Mosler, Problems and Tasks of International Judicial and Arbitral 
Settlement, in JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES (Mosler and Bernhardt, eds., 
1974) at 10 (arguing that defining the legal nature of a dispute by linking it to an underlying right 
as established by international law is an unhelpful distinction). 
 82. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J at 27, 37.  
 83. For further explanation of the U.S. position, see an article by then Deputy Agent for the 
United States in the Nicaragua proceedings Patrick M. Norton, The Nicaragua Case:  Political 
Questions Before the International Court of Justice, 27 VA. J. INT’L  L. 459 (1987). 
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United States stated its view that the ICJ “was never intended to resolve 
issues of collective security and self-defense and is patently unsuited for 
such a role.”84 
This reasoning is not new. States object to judicial interference in 
political matters on the grounds that it interferes with their sovereign 
rights, that the issues are too complex for the Court to address, that the 
decision implicates broader public interests outside the purview of the 
Court, and that the Court ought to restrain its activities in accordance 
with the roles of other institutions such as the UNGA and the UNSC.85 
Ultimately, the ICJ found that it had jurisdiction to consider Nicaragua’s 
claims against the U.S. on the merits and decided in favor of 
Nicaragua.86 
As Nicaragua suggests, the doctrine of justiciability is not a strong 
limitation on the exercise of international judicial power.87 Absent 
objective criteria, distinguishing political from legal becomes a matter 
of preference and philosophy.88 Furthermore, international courts today 
recognize that international disputes are often a mix of political and 
legal dimensions.89 Thus, it is helpful to understand justiciable disputes 
as those that the judicial process is best designed to address. Identifying 
when and why adjudication is the superior method for resolving a 
dispute is pragmatic and emphasizes the need to base valuation of 
adjudication on its effectiveness as a tool for dispute resolution.90  
Nonetheless, the doctrine of justiciability remains relevant.91 
Justiciability provides States with a means, however modest, by which 
 
 84. Statement of the Department of State on U.S. Withdrawal from Nicaragua Proceedings, 
19 January 1985, 79 AM. J. INT’L L. 438, 439 (1985). 
 85. See, e.g., Western Sahara, ICJ Reports 1975 ¶¶ 46–47 (where the ICJ was challenged by 
the lack of factual sources and their competency to engage in problem solving in this context). 
 86. Norton, supra note 83, at 525;  The ICJ found it had jurisdiction by 11-to-4 vote, per the 
ICJ Statute, to hear the substantive issues of the case and decided in its June 1986; Judgment to 
uphold the Nicaraguan claims against the United States. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. ¶ 292; Statute of 
the International Court of Justice, art. 36(2), (5), Oct. 24, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031. 
 87. Norton, supra note 83, at 525. 
 88. See MCWHINNEY, supra note 80, at 45 (describing the political dimension to defining 
justiciability, specifically how the distinction between justiciable and nonjusticiable cases shifts 
in relation to the ICJ’s efforts to cooperate with other institutions). 
 89. Norton, supra note 83, at 499. 
 90. For literature advocating this approach, see Rosalyn Higgins, Policy Considerations and 
the International Judicial Process, 17 INT’L. & COMP. L. Q. 58, 74 (1968); MCWHINNEY, supra 
note 80, at 44–45 (suggesting that this distinction is pragmatic in nature for determining when 
judicial intervention would provide a benefit to an already political problem). 
 91. “It is well established in international law that no State can, without its consent, be 
compelled to submit its disputes with other States either to mediation or to arbitration, or to any 
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to limit the exercise of judicial power and control the nature and scope 
of the international judicial function. Until the international community 
grapples with States’ discomfort with judicial power, this doctrine will 
continue to serve as a measure of when and in what capacity judicial 
intervention is appropriate. 
B.  Litispendence 
If international courts are to serve as peacemakers, what is their 
appropriate role and how should they interact with other IDR 
institutions? This question is one of coordination. The doctrine of 
litispendence addresses this problem by articulating a standard that aims 
to avoid conflicts over jurisdiction.92 The doctrine of litispendence is a 
plea that can be raised when there is “(i) an identical matter, (ii) pending 
between the same parties, (iii) before organs possessing similar 
jurisdiction,” for the purpose of barring one institution from handling 
the case.93 
In the context of promoting peace in the face of armed conflict, 
jurisdictional conflicts most commonly occur between the ICJ and the 
UNSC.94 The UN Charter established both institutions in the pursuit of 
global peace and security,95 but they have different emphases. The 
UNSC is charged with the primary responsibility of maintaining 
international peace and security,96 while the ICJ is charged with settling 
international legal disputes.97 The UNSC is a political body comprised 
of States whereas the ICJ is a judicial body, which purports to be 
independent from individual States and represents the interests of the 
international community as a whole.98 So what is the appropriate action 
when both institutions seek to address the same international dispute? 
 This question arose in the Lockerbie case where the ICJ had to 
determine two legal disputes:  whether Libya had an international 
 
other kind of pacific settlement.” Eastern Carelia (Fin v. Russ.) 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 5, at 27 
(July 23). 
 92. ELSEN, supra note 10, at 1. 
 93. DAVID SCHWEIGMAN, THE AUTHORITY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL UNDER CHAPTER 
VII OF THE UN CHARTER 217 (Kluwer Law Int’l ed., 2001). See also ELSEN, supra note 10, at 1. 
 94. ELSEN, supra note 10, at 1. 
 95. U.N. Charter, supra note 7, art. 7. 
 96. Id. art. 24. 
 97. Id. art. 92 (“the ICJ shall be the principle judicial organ of the UN”).  See also Statute of 
the International Court of Justice, 59 Stat. 1031 (1945) (giving the ICJ the power to “settle all 
legal disputes concerning a) the interpretation of a treaty and b) any question of international 
law”). 
 98. U.N. Charter arts. 4, 92. 
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obligation to extradite its nationals, and whether the United States and 
the United Kingdom had a claim that Libya should be implicated in 
terrorism.99 After the claims were filed, the UNSC called upon Libya in 
Resolution 748 to extradite its nationals.100 Under Article 39 of the UN 
Charter the UNSC has the authority to determine “the existence of any 
threat to peace . . . and to maintain or restore international peace and 
security.”101 While the ICJ recognized the UNSC’s preeminence, the 
Court had to determine whether this frustrated its judicial function of 
settling legal disputes.102 As stated by ICJ Judge Alejandro Alvarez in 
his dissent, “If a case submitted to the Court should constitute a threat to 
world peace, the Security Council may seise itself of the case and put an 
end to the Court’s jurisdiction.”103 In Lockerbie, the ICJ initially 
deferred to the UNSC’s resolution when considering interim measures 
regarding protection.104 But later, during the merits phase, the ICJ 
determined it possessed the authority and jurisdiction to decide the 
matters before it.105 
Lockerbie may suggest that although the ICJ respects the role of 
the UNSC, it does not find itself restricted by UNSC resolutions on the 
basis of the political doctrine question.106 Similarly, in Kanyabashi, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda found that the political 
 
 99. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising 
from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. U.S.), Provisional Measures, 
1992 I.C.J. 132, 132–34 (Apr. 14) (declaration of Judge Ni). 
 100. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising 
from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. U.S.), Provisional Measures, 
 1992 I.C.J. 129, 129 (Apr. 14) (declaration of Acting President Oda) [hereinafter Declaration of 
Acting President Oda].  
 101. U.N. Charter art. 39. 
 102. Declaration of Acting President Oda, supra note 100, at 129 (“Whatever might have 
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conclusion other than that to which it has come.”). Questions of Interpretation and Application of 
the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya v. U.S.), Provisional Measures, 1992 I.C.J. 199, 207 (Apr. 14) (dissenting opinion of 
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proceedings before the ICJ). 
 103. Anglo-Iranian Oil Case (U.K. v. Iran), 1952 I.C.J. 93, 45 (July 22) (dissenting opinion of 
Judge Alejandro Alvarez). 
 104. SCHWEIGMAN, supra note 93, at 256–58. 
 105. Id. at 258–60 (there have been three cases where the ICJ deferred to the UNSC). See 
also Mark Weller, The Lockerbie Case:  A Premature End to the ‘New World Order’?, 4 AFR. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 303, 324 (1992) (arguing that UNSC decisions carry a presumption of 
lawfulness that enhances States obligations to comply with the ICJ’s decision, even if the State 
considers that decision to be ultra vires). 
 106. Weller, supra note 105, at 324. 
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question doctrine did not bar their jurisdiction for judicial review.107 In 
Tadic, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
Trial Chamber applied the political question doctrine in determining 
that it could not review UNSC’s decision justifying the creation of the 
Tribunal.108 However, the Appeals Chamber reversed, finding that the 
political question doctrine was antiquated and that the Court had a duty 
to take jurisdiction over cases that turn on a legal question capable of a 
legal answer, regardless of the political context.109  
III.  COURTS AS DISPUTE RESOLVERS 
This section introduces a third way to understand the international 
judicial function of international courts that appreciates the functional 
purpose of dispute settlement alongside the normative purpose of 
peacemaking. As dispute resolvers, international courts can serve both 
aims. Adopting this perspective of the international judicial function of 
international courts enhances understanding about their multiplicity, 
complexity, and value in today’s world. 
A.  The Changing Nature of International Disputes 
After the Peace of Westphalia, States created an international order 
in which they were the dominant actors.110 The doctrine of sovereignty 
afforded each nation the right to rule its territory and its subjects 
without external interference.111 These foundations influenced States as 
they developed interstate arbitration forums and, later, courts.112 In 
addition, since most wars at that time were interstate, there was little 
incentive to develop international judicial institutions that involved non-
 
 107. See Prosecutor v. Joseph Kanyabashi, Case No. ICTR-96-15-T, Decision on the Defence 
Motion on Jurisdiction, ¶ 22 (June 18, 1997), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/ 
Kanyabashi/decisions/180697.pdf. 
 108. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defense Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 24 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 
1995).  
 109. Id. 
 110. See HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS VOL. II 33–50 (1925) (trans. Francis W. 
Kelsey) and Hersch Lauterpacht, The Grotian Tradition in International Law, 23 BRIT. Y.B. 
INT’L. L. 1, 1–54 (1946) (both discussing the Peace of Westphalia and its influence on the 
international legal order). 
 111. STEPHEN KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY:  ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 20–25 (1999) (defining 
Westphalian sovereignty as the legal and political authority a State has to rule based on the 
principles of territoriality and nonintervention into a State’s internal affairs). 
 112. See STÉPHANE BEAULAC, THE POWER OF LANGUAGE IN THE MAKING OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 69 (2004). 
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State actors. Instead, the assumption was that their States would 
represent these actors at the interstate level.113 As Lauterpacht stated, “A 
wrong done to the individual is a wrong done to his State.”114  
 The changing nature of international disputes is challenging the 
historical assumptions that justified a State-centric international dispute 
resolution system. Over the past several decades, armed conflict has 
shifted from interstate to intrastate, and most wars today are intrastate.115 
Intrastate disputes involve the rights and interests of individuals, 
communities, and other non-State actors.  
Resolving these disputes necessarily requires involving the key 
stakeholders and considering the core issues. This is a challenge for 
most international courts, which, for example, lack jurisdiction over 
non-State actors and extralegal issues. Furthermore, it can be 
challenging for courts to access the relevant stakeholders or confirm the 
essential facts.116 Another challenge facing international courts in this 
context is that States are often reluctant to participate in a process that 
equalizes the power of non-State parties.117  
These challenges require reevaluating the role and function of 
international courts in today’s world. Prioritizing international dispute 
resolution as a normative aim requires international courts to address 
their strengths and weaknesses. It also raises important questions about 
how open and accessible international legal processes should be.118  
 
 113. See id. at 179. 
 114. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 42, at 154. 
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B.  IDR as a System 
One response to these challenges is to understand the international 
judicial function as a component of a larger IDR system. IDR has 
commonly been characterized as a spectrum of single-method options.119 
The choice of IDR method is often conflated with the institution that 
provides it. International courts and tribunals offer judicial methods of 
dispute resolution. Commissions, organizations, and ad hoc groups offer 
non-judicial methods of dispute resolution. Though exceptions exist, 
such as the PCA’s offering of arbitration, conciliation, fact-finding and 
inquiry, the prevailing perception remains that the choice of IDR 
method is concordant with the institution that provides it.120 This 
promotes methodological and institutional fragmentation, which can 
foster a false perception that parties must choose between “legal” or 
“diplomatic” IDR methods. 
However, given the complexity of international disputes today, 
dispute resolution often requires the use of more than one method. This 
is why it is important to understand how various IDR methods and the 
institutions that provide them operate alongside each other as a 
comprehensive system. Collectively, each part of the system plays its 
part and strengthens the overall objective. By appreciating how different 
IDR processes contribute to effective dispute resolution, international 
courts can enhance their ability to resolve disputes. 
C.  Integrating Judicial and Non-Judicial IDR 
 An important benefit that flows from understanding IDR as a 
system is the practice of integrating judicial and non-judicial IDR 
methods.121 The following cases illustrate integrated IDR (in either a 
sequential or a mixed manner) and how such approaches have led to the 
successful resolution of international disputes. 
Sequential use of IDR occurs when parties apply multiple methods 
to a dispute. For example, in the Red Sea Islands dispute between 
Eritrea and Yemen, negotiation, mediation, and arbitration were applied 
 
nature of subjects and how political communities engage in decision-making and other 
democratic processes). 
 119. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Postmodern, 
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in a sequential manner.122 Armed conflict broke out after both nations 
claimed rights to the Greater Hanish Islands, in part due to the mineral 
and fishing resources located there. After engaging in mediation efforts 
with Ethiopia, Egypt, the UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, and 
finally France, an agreement was reached that led the parties to submit 
the matter to the PCA.123 The PCA issued two awards that delimited 
maritime boundaries and clarified fishing privileges.124 The use of 
multiple forms of IDR in a sequential process ultimately led to a 
resolution of the dispute with Eritrea acknowledging that this outcome 
would “pave the way for a harmonious relationship between the littoral 
States of the Red Sea”125 and Yemen noting that the PCA award was the 
“culmination of a great diplomatic effort.”126  
In the Pedra Branca dispute between Malaysia and Singapore, 
both countries engaged in negotiations prior to and after referring the 
case to adjudication before the ICJ.127 The use of judicial settlement at 
the ICJ and mediation with local stakeholders in the Frontier Dispute 
case helped the governments of Mali and Burkina Faso reach a cease-
fire and work to resolve their underlying resource disputes.128 In the 
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Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the First Stage of the Proceedings (Eri. v. Yemen), ¶ 526 
(Perm. Ct. Arb. 1998), http://untreaty.un.org/cod/riaa/cases/vol_XXII/209-332.pdf. 
 125. Barbara Kwiatkowska, The Eritrea/Yemen Arbitration:  Landmark Progress in the 
Acquisition of Territorial Sovereignty and Equitable Maritime Boundary Delimitation, 8 INT’L 
BOUNDARIES RES. UNIT BOUNDARY & SEC. BULL. 66, 67 (2000). 
 126. Id. 
 127. The countries agreed to submit the dispute to the ICJ through a negotiated Special 
Agreement. See S. JAYAKUMAR & TOMMY KOH, PEDRA BRANCA:  THE ROAD TO THE WORLD 
COURT  35 (2009) (detailing the negotiations leading up to the resolution by the ICJ); Tan Hsien-
Li, Case Concerning Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Palau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South 
Ledge (Malaysia/Singapore), 12 SING. Y.B. INT’L L. 257, 258 (2008) (describing the territorial 
dispute in detail); Coalter G. Lathrop, Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Palau Batu Puteh, Middle 
Rocks and South Ledge, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 828, 828 (2008) (examining the ICJ’s treatment of 
the dispute and its resolution). 
 128. Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 554, 562. 
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Thailand-Philippines dispute before the WTO, the parties engaged in 
facilitation and mediation.129  
The use of integrated IDR can also occur in a mixed manner, 
defined as combining parts of different IDR methods into one cohesive 
process. For example, in the Malaysia-Singapore case, the ITLOS 
integrated fact-finding and facilitation into its judicial approach by 
calling for “the establishment of a group of independent experts to study 
the land reclamation issues” and make recommendations.130  
D.  New Roles for International Courts 
Enhancing the international judicial function of dispute resolution 
through integrated IDR can only occur if international courts embrace 
new roles.131 This article suggests three.  
First, courts should recognize how non-judicial IDR can contribute 
to the resolution of international disputes. To do so, international courts 
need to understand the value of non-judicial IDR methods. These 
methods are collaborative, interest-based, voluntary, non-binding, and 
ad hoc in nature. They have benefits that judicial processes do not, such 
as encouraging parties to address emotional and psychological factors 
that are contributing to their dispute.132 Interest-based IDR methods help 
the parties adopt shared norms and expectations, which enhances the 
legitimacy of the outcomes.133 Mediation, for example, offers States full 
participation in and some control over the process, the ability to address 
the full range of issues and stakeholders, and offers face-saving political 
aspects.134 This may explain why States prefer mediation to judicial 
 
 129. Request for Mediation by the Philippines, Thailand and the European Communities, 
Communication from the Director-General, ¶ 5, WT/GC/66 (Oct. 16, 2002); Nilaratna Xuto, 
Thailand:  Conciliating a Dispute on Tuna Exports to the EC, in MANAGING THE CHALLENGES 
OF WTO PARTICIPATION, 45 CASE STUDIES 555, 560 (Peter Gallagher et al. eds., 2005) (detailing 
the agreement by the parties to submit to mediation, should the consultations fail). 
 130. Sands, supra note 1, at 68. 
 131. See FRANCISCO ORREGO VICUNA, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN AN 
EVOLVING GLOBAL SOCIETY:  CONSTITUTIONALIZATION, ACCESSIBILITY, PRIVATIZATION 22 
(2004) (discussing how globalization makes new demands of international courts and the 
importance of nonjudicial IDR methods). 
 132. See Herbert C. Kelman, Socio-Psychological Dimensions of International Conflict, in 
PEACEMAKING IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT:  METHODS AND TECHNIQUES 61, 63 (I. William 
Zartman & J. Lewis Rasmussen eds., 1997) (discussing the emotional and psychological 
underpinnings of international conflict). 
 133. For literature discussing the use and value of non-judicial IDR, see JACOB BERCOVITCH 
AND RICHARD JACKSON, CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY:  PRINCIPLES, 
METHODS, AND APPROACHES (2009).  
 134. BERCOVITCH & FRETTER, supra note 70, at 29 fig. 2. 
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settlement as a method of addressing international disputes that arise in 
the context of armed conflict.135 
Beyond recognition, international courts should also engage in 
referral, when appropriate. Just as domestic courts refer cases to 
settlement talks or mediation, international courts can do the same.136 
The ICJ has stated that: 
the judicial settlement of international disputes, with a view to which 
the Court has been established, is simply an alternative to the direct 
and friendly settlement of such disputes between the Parties; . . . 
consequently it is for the Court to facilitate, so far as is compatible 
with its Statute, such direct and friendly settlement.137 
 In Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf and Gabcikovo-Nagymaros 
Project, the ICJ has called upon, encouraged, and even ordered parties 
to engage in other forms of IDR.138 In North Sea Continental Shelf, the 
ICJ required the parties to utilize a conciliation commission to continue 
negotiation about the delimitation of the maritime boundary.139 The ICJ 
discussed several criteria for the negotiation but left it to the parties to 
determine the result.140 In Qatar v. Bahrain, the ICJ required the parties 
to negotiate prior to submitting the case after Saudi Arabia had 
attempted to resolve the matter through mediation.141 The ICJ also 
ordered the parties to undertake negotiation in good faith for an 
equitable solution of their differences in Fisheries Jurisdiction.142 There, 
the Court stated: 
 
 135. Id. See also Patrick M. Norton, The Nicaragua Case:  Political Questions Before the 
International Court of Justice, 27 VA. J. INT’L L. 459 (1987) (“States generally prefer means of 
dispute resolution other than adjudication. This preference is attributable to the risks of 
adjudication generally, the potential for bias in adjudication in international disputes, and the 
inherent inability of the judicial process to fashion durable solutions to complex international 
problems.”). 
 136. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 5). 
 137. See Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999 (Pak. v. India), Judgment, 2000 I.C.J. 2, ¶ 52 
(June 21) (citing Free Zones of Upper Savoy and District of Gex (Fr. v. Switz.), Order, 1929 
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 22, at 13 (Aug. 19)). 
 138.  Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, 1985 I.C.J. 13, 24 (June 
3); Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. 30. 
 139. North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Den.; Ger. v Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 28 
(Feb. 20). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. 
Bahr.), Judgment, 1994 I.C.J. 112 (July 1) and Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions 
between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahr.), Judgment, 1995 I.C.J. 6 (Feb. 15). 
 142. Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), Merits, Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. 3, 32 ¶¶ 74–75, 79(3) 
& (4), (July 25); (declaration by Judge Ignacio-Pinto and dissenting opinion of Judge Petrén). 
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It is implicit in the concept of preferential rights that negotiations are 
required in order to define or delimit the  extent of those rights . . . . 
The obligation to negotiate thus  flows from the very nature of the 
respective rights of the  Parties: to direct them to negotiate is 
therefore a proper  exercise of the judicial function in this case. This 
also corresponds to the principals and provisions of the  Charter of 
the United Nations concerning peaceful  settlement of  disputes.143 
In these cases, the ICJ referred the parties to interest-based dispute 
resolution methods in addition to providing them with the rights-based 
process of adjudication.144  
The PCA has also engaged in referral in the Abyei Arbitration, 
where, in determining the boundaries of the Ngok Dinka chiefdoms, the 
PCA called upon the parties to take the next step to executing the final 
arbitration award, noting the need to develop a “survey team to 
demarcate the Abyei Area as delimited by this Award,”145 and issuing its 
hopes “that the spirit of reconciliation and cooperation visible 
throughout these proceedings . . . will continue to animate the Parties on 
this matter.”146 
 
 143. Fisheries Jurisdiction, 1974 I.C.J. at 32, ¶¶ 74–75. But see Dissent, Judge Ignacio-Pinto 
(the ICJ’s role is to make decisions based on law) and Dissent, Judge Petren (there is no 
obligation to negotiate absent a common agreement between the parties). 
 144. Special Agreement between Denmark and the FRG (Feb. 2, 1967), http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/51/9329.pdf and Special Agreement between the FRG and the Netherlands, 
1967 I.C.J. ¶ 2 (Feb. 2), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/51/9329.pdf; Special Agreement 
between Tunisia and Libya, art. 2 (June 10, 1977), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/63/ 
9511.pdf; Special Agreement between Hungary and Slovakia, art. 5, ¶ 2 (Apr. 7, 1993), 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/92/10835.pdf. See also YASUHIRO SHIGETA, INTERNATIONAL 
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION:  STANDARD SETTING, COMPLIANCE 
CONTROL AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 44–48 (2010) 
(discussing the ICJ’s decisions in the Fisheries cases). 
 145. Delimiting Abyei Area, Final Award, supra note 8, ¶ 769. 
 146. Id. (settling the dispute over the Abyei Area by resolving conflicts over the boundary 
lines); see Hans, Abyei Arbitration Award, Abyei Arbitration Award, PEACE PALACE LIBRARY 
(July 22, 2009, 3:18 PM), http://peacepalacelibrary-weekly.blogspot.com/2009/07/abyei-
arbitration-award.html (summarizing the key elements of the final award of the Abyei 
Arbitration). The Government of the Republic of the Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army signed the Arbitration Agreement on July 7, 2008, 
authorizing the referral of the dispute to the PCA for final and binding arbitration. At issue was 
whether or not the Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC), established by the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement (CPA), exceeded its mandate under the CPA to delimit and demarcate an area 
identified as the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms. The parties agreed in the Arbitration Agreement to 
authorize the PCA, upon a finding that the ABC did exceed its mandate to delimit and demarcate 
the area in dispute. The PCA determined that the ABC did exceed its mandate in part. 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of the Sudan and the 
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army, Government Sudan-
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The practice of referral raises questions that international courts 
will need to address. Should referral, for example, be based on what is 
in the best interest of the parties or what a court deems necessary to 
achieve resolution? What is the appropriate order of applying different 
forms of IDR? If international courts engage in referral, how might this 
jeopardize their judicial settlement function?147 While considering 
important questions such as these, international courts should strive to 
normalize the practice of referring parties to non-judicial IDR, when 
appropriate, as a part of the judicial function. Through referral, 
international courts can promote the use of integrated IDR and support 
the development of adequate institutional capacity for non-judicial 
methods.  
A third and more intensive role for international courts is that of a 
coordinator of IDR methods.148 The international judiciary might 
advance the resolution of international disputes by serving as a “Multi-
Door Courthouse” of sorts, which informs and encourages disputing 
parties to engage in IDR methods beyond judicial settlement. By 
engaging in this role, international courts will be able to promote 
systematic integration of IDR methods across institutions, while also 
insulating their primary function as dispute settlers. They will also 
contribute to the development of a coherent and functional structure that 
 
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army, Jan. 9, 2005, 
http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/pdfs/HSBA-Docs-CPA-1.pdf (outlining the terms of the 
comprehensive peace agreement established by the Government of the Republic of Sudan and the 
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army on Jan. 9, 2005). But see 
generally Delimiting Abyei Area (Sudan v. The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army) 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Awn Shawkat Al-Khasawneh (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2009) 
http://www.pca-cpa.org/showfile.asp?fil_id=1242 (criticizing the Court for not doing enough to 
resolve the dispute, although subsequent to the decision both parties announced that they would 
accept and abide by the PCA’s ruling). 
 147. For example, there is a concern that adding additional IDR methods might contribute to 
the existing problem of fragmentation in the international judicial system, as described in 
Fragmentation of International Law:  Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion 
of International Law, Int’l Law Comm’n, 58th sess., May 1-June 9, July 3-Aug. 11, 2006, ¶ 24, 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006).  
 148. See Higgins, supra note 39, at 15–20 (suggesting that the ICJ can help prompt 
integration between judicial and other dispute resolution forums across regions and cultures but 
should not aim to replace them as a supranational body); Paul S. Berman, Global Legal 
Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155, 1155–56 (2007) (introducing the idea that countries should 
embrace multiple ways of resolving conflict because of the insights the various actors can 
provide); Tomer Broude, Fragmentation(s) of International Law:  On Normative Integration as 
Authority Allocation, in The SHIFTING ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:  
CONSIDERING SOVEREIGNTY, SUPREMACY AND SUBSIDIARITY 99, 99–100 (Tomer Broude & 
Yuval Shany eds., 2008). 
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clarifies the relational web among methods. Doing so will create a space 
for the development of complex integrated IDR approaches that can 
contribute to the resolution of international disputes. 
CONCLUSION 
This article has argued that international courts exist to serve a 
functional purpose of settling international disputes as well as a 
normative one of promoting global peace and security. As an alternative 
to the dichotomy of viewing international courts as dispute settlers or as 
peacemakers, the article has proposed an alternative framework for 
understanding the international judicial function as one of dispute 
resolution. As dispute resolvers, international courts exist alongside 
other institutions in an IDR system. International courts can enhance 
their ability to contribute to dispute resolution by recognizing the value 
of other IDR methods and referring parties to engage in such methods 
when appropriate. Furthermore, international courts can provide 
institutional support integrating judicial and other dispute resolution 
methods. By embracing these new roles, international courts will 
enhance their ability to resolve disputes and promote a more peaceful 
and secure world.  
